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SOME THOUGHTS ON THE FUTURE OF REMEDIAL
RACE AND GENDER PREFERENCES
UNDER TITLE VII
PAUL N. Cox*
"Wrong and remedy are best wed by candidly surfacing the
targeted wrong"**
The question of affirmative action, or of reverse discrimination,'
in employment has once again became controversial. It is likely to
remain so for the foreseeable future for two reasons. First, the
Supreme Court, in Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts,' recently addressed
the question of federal court -authority to order racial preferences as
a remedy for employment discrimination. Second, the Reagan Admin-
istration, initially and most emphatically through the Justice
Department, and more recently and indirectly in comments made and
actions taken by the current chairman of the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission and by the Civil Rights Commission, has under-
taken a sustained attack on a number of fronts against court ordered,
governmentally imposed and voluntarily adopted race and gender
preferences favoring minorities and women.'
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University.
** P. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge, concurring in Williams v. City of New
Orleans. 729 F.2d 1554, 1566 (5th Cir. 1984).
1. "Affirmative action" and "reverse discrimination" are partisan labels for
the present subject matter. I will most often employ the term "preference" to describe
that subject matter because, whatever one's position on these questions, "affirmative
action" and "reverse discrimination" in fact entail race and gender preferences.
Candor nevertheless requires the disclosure that I have been in the past and
remain an opponent of such preferences, at least where Congress has not expressly
mandated them. See Cox, The Question of "Voluntary" Racial Employment Quotas And
Some Thoughts on Judicial Role, 23 ARIZ. L. REv. 87 (1981).
2. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
3. For example, the EEOC has undertaken reviews of its directives regard-
ing federal agency affirmative action plans in light of Stotts and has undertaken a
study of "goals and timetables" and even of its employee selection guidelines in the
private sector. See EMPLOYEE REL. WKLY. (BNA) (Jan. 18, 1985) at 111. The EEOC chair-
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This paper reviews the legal rationales which have been em-
ployed to justify race and gender preferences, examines Stotts and
its implications for anti-discrimination theory, and examines the cur-
rent viability of United Steelworkers v. Weber' in light of those
implications.
I. A SUMMARY OF THE PRIOR LAW OF REMEDIAL PREFERENCES
It is initially necessary to rehearse some definitions and some
prior case law. For present purposes, a race or gender preference
is a decision rule that requires reference to the race or gender of
persons subject to the rule to determine its application. For example,
a hiring preference requiring that 50% of persons hired shall be
women until a workforce is composed 50% of women requires
reference to the gender of applicants for employment. A preference
in this sense is to be distinguished from a compensatory preference
requiring that some set of persons determined to have been harmed
by identified acts of unlawful conduct be hired or promoted.' A com-
pensatory preference requires reference to the victim or non-victim
status of persons subject to the preference before applying it, but
does not require reference to the race or gender, qua race or gender,
of such persons.
There are a number of contexts in which race and gender pref-
erences occur. A race or gender preference favoring minorities or
women may be imposed by a court as a remedy. For example, federal
courts have imposed goals and timetables designed to achieve propor-
tional race and gender representation in a workforce following findings
of unlawful employment discrimination under Title VIL' A race or
man, Clarence Thomas, has repeatedly indicated his opposition to quotes, goals and
timetables. Id. Nov. 19, 1984, at 1413. Members of the Civil Rights Commission have
taken a similar position. Id. Oct. 15, 1984, at 1262. The Justice Department has repeated-
ly intervened in a number of actions, including Stots, challenging the authority of
courts to order preferences and the authority of local governments to enact preferences.
See, e.g., Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984); Williams v. City
of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984).
4. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
5. See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 367-71 (1977); Associa-
tion Against Discrimination in Employment, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982).
6. See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 663 F.2d 1354, 1356 (7th Cir.
1981); Association Against Discrimination in Employment, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport,
647 F.2d 256, 284-87 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982); Boston Chapter,
NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1026-27 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
910 (1975). Although it is occasionally stated that a defendant must engage in "clear
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gender preference may be imposed by a government either on its own
employment practices or on private employers. For example, a federal
executive order imposes affirmative action obligations designed to
achieve race and gender balance in the workforces of federal
contractors.7 A race or gender preference may be privately adopted.
For example, a private employer might adopt a preference out of fear
that failure to do so risks liability under Title VII; a racial imbalance
in an employer's workforce may be used as evidence of discrimination
Finally, a race or gender preference may be adopted in a settlement
agreement or consent decree. For example, hiring and promotion goals
were adopted in the consent decree at issue in Stotts.9
A race or gender preference, whether or not labeled benign or
remedial, by definition requires disparate treatment "because of' race
or gender. Title VII prohibits employment discrimination "because of'
race or gender" and contains a specific provision stating that it does
not "require" racial balance in a workforce." Moreover, the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the equal protection
component of Fifth Amendment due process prohibit the state, local
and federal governments from discrimination motivated by race, ab-
sent compelling government interests,2 and prohibit discrimination
motivated by gender, unless the discrimination serves important gov-
ernment objectives and is substantially related to those objectives. 3
How, then, have the courts justified race and gender preferences favor-
ing minorities or women?
cut" or "egregious" discrimination to warrant preferences for non-victims, these phrases
have not been limited to instances in which disparate treatment has been found. See,
e.g., Association Against Discrimination in Employment, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport,
647 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982); Davis v. County of Los
Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1343-44 (9th Cir. 1977). vacated as moot, 440 U.S. 625 (1979);
Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1027-28 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 910 (1975); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Service Comm'n,
482 F.2d 1333, 1336 (2d Cir. 1973).
7. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965), reprinted at, 42 U.S.C.
S 2000e (1982). See 41 C.F.R. Pt. 60 (1984).
8. See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 228-29 (5th
Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J. dissenting), rev'd sub nom., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979).
9. See Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
10. See generally 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2 (1982).
11. Title VII S 703(j), 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(j) (1982).
12. See Gunther, Forward. In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
13. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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Preferences Judicially Imposed as Remedies Under Title VII
The lower federal courts have justified court-ordered preferences
in the Title VII context on the theory that Title VII's substantive
definitions of prohibited and permitted conduct do not limit or affect
the character or scope of the remedies imposed for unlawful conduct.
That is, race and gender preferences designed to achieve proportional
allocation of employment opportunities among race or gender groups
may be imposed where a court has concluded that an employer's con-
duct constituted unlawful discrimination, even though racial imbalance
is not, as such, unlawful discrimination.'
Two points should be noticed about this rationale. First, racial
preferences imposed as remedies under Title VII may benefit both
actual victims of discrimination and non-victims. 5 For example, a quota
remedy requiring that an employer hire a minimum percentage of
minorities until its workforce achieves a particular composition benefits
minority persons hired under that remedy whether or not those per-
sons were victims of the employer's prior discriminatory practices.
Second, to the extent that a remedial preference benefits non-victims,
Title VII remedies do not comport with the traditional common law
notion that a remedy must fit a violation. 6 If a Title VII violation
is understood as a discrete wrongful act generating discrete harm to
discrete individuals, the scope of the remedy exceeds the scope of
the substantive violation on which it is based. However, to the ex-
tent that a violation is understood, instead, as a wrongful failure to
correct misallocations of societal resources among race or gender
groups, race or gender preferences rather tightly fit that understand-
ing. 17 Formal definitions of unlawful discrimination under Title VII
14. See, e.g., Association Against Discrimination in Employment, Inc. v. City
of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1981). cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982); Rios v.
Enterprise Ass'n of Steamfitters, Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974).
15. To the extent that a remedial preference, such as a priority hiring order,
applies only to persons found to be victims of discrete acts of employment discrimina-
tion, the remedy is compensatory and does not raise the issues treated in this article.
See Association Against Discrmination In Employment, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 647
F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 19811, cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982).
16. See Brest, Forward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1, 41 (1976).
17. Cf. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235(1971)
(distinguishing discrimination as unequal treatment and discrimination as unequal
achievement); Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Anti-discrimination
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) (com-
paring "perpetrator perspective" that focuses on discrete wrongful acts with the broader
remedial perspective implicit in the disparate impact theory of discrimination).
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do not directly treat such failures as a violation, but they may be
viewed as indirectly doing so.
The disparate impact theory of discrimination illustrates the
latter point.18 Under that theory, an employer's use of a race and
gender neutral employment criterion, such as an education require-
ment for hiring, constitutes unlawful discrimination if (1) it excludes
minorities or women from an employment opportunity at a greater
rate than it excludes whites or males, and (2) it is not shown to be
"necessary" to the employer's business interests.9 A central rationale
for the disparate impact theory is that some race and gender neutral
criteria give continuing effect to past societal discrimination.' For ex-
ample, education and testing requirements having a disparate impact
on minorities give present effect to historical discrimination in
education.2 To the extent, at least, that the business necessity defense
is made difficult to establish, the disparate impact theory is functional-
ly a prohibition of an employer's failure to do its part to correct past
discrimination by foregoing non-essential business practices and by
absorbing the costs of eliminating those practices.'
18. The disparate treatment theory of discrimination may also result in in-
direct liability for imbalance because some proof schemes for establishing disparate
treatment rely on disparities in workforce representation rates. See Hazelwood School
District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). To the extent, however, that courts
rely upon representation rate disparities only as evidence of intentional discrimina-
tion and require proof of the race or gender composition of qualified labor pools for
purposes of comparing representation rates in a workforce, this risk is minimized. See id.
The primary difficulty in this context lies in the allocation of the burden of
proof. To the extent that a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case and therefore
shift the burden of proof to a defendant on the basis of a comparison of general popula-
tion data with workforce data, the absence of data regarding the composition of a
qualified labor pool in a relevant geographical area operates to impose liability for
workforce imbalances by rendering rebuttal ineffective. Of course, allocation of the
burden of comparing workforce composition to qualified labor pool composition to a
plaintiff in circumstances in which data regarding the latter composition is unavailable
or questionable may result in underenforcement of the disparate treatment prohibi-
tion. Compare E.E.O.C. v. United Virginia Bank, 615 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980) with Gay
v. Waiters & Lunchmen's Union, Local 30, 489 F. Supp. 282 (N.D. Cal. 1980), afJ'd,
694 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1982).
19. See, e.g., New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
20. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
21. Id.
22. See Cox, Substance and Process in Employment Discrimination Law: One
View of the Swamp. 18 VAL. U.L. REV. 21, 83-97 (1983).
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Governmentally Adopted Preferences and the Constitution
The Supreme Court has justified governmentally adopted racial
preferences in the face of constitutional attacks on a number of diverse
rationales, no one of which can be said to have gained the support
of a majority of the justices. Again central to all of these rationales,
however, is the notion that a benign racial preference is remedial.
Under one rationale, government may utilize a racial preference bene-
fiting minorities where its objective is to remedy the "continuing ef-
fects of past discrimination" and where the preference does not abso-
lutely exclude non-minorities and does not "stigmatize" as inferior
either the persons benefited by or the persons excluded by the
preference." Under a second rationale, a competent governmental en-
tity must make "findings" of discrimination and the preference
employed to remedy that discrimination must be permissible in the
sense that the preference cannot be permanent and cannot operate
as an absolute bar to non-minorities.24 Governmentally imposed racial
preferences are therefore constitutionally permissible under these ra-
tionales because remedying the effects of past discrimination is a per-
missible and "compelling" or "important" objective, at least if the
preferences are judicially characterized as narrowly tailored to that
objective. The crucial distinction between the rationales is the ques-
tion of the competence of the governmental fact finder; it is possible
that some justices would require a legislative and, perhaps, a con-
gressional "finding" of discrimination.'
Notice that the term "remedy" in both constitutional rationales
has the broad meaning ascribed to the term when racial preferences
are imposed by a court under Title VII: minority persons benefited
need not establish that they are victims of an identified act of dis-
crimination. These persons need only establish that they are members
of the minority group defined by the preference, because the "dis-
23. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448. 517-19 (1980) (Marshall, J. concurr-
ing); Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361 (1978) (Bren-
nan, J. concurring). With respects to the question of whether a "benign" preference
does or does not entail stigma, see Cox, supra note 22, at 35; Cox, supra note 1, at
150 n. 422.
24. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 495-517 (1980) (Powell, J. concurring);
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305-15 (1978) (Opinion
of Powell, J.).
25. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 508-10 (1980) (Powell, J. concurr-
ing). Cf id. at 476-78 (Opinion of Burger, C.J.) (emphasizing congressional authority
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment as a justification for a congressionally adopted
preference). But see, e.g., Detroit Police Officers Ass'n. v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 4 [1985], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss4/1
RACE AND GENDER PREFERENCES
crimination" referenced in these rationales is historical societal dis-
crimination against that group and the "present effects" remedied by
the preference are racial imbalances in present allocations of oppor-
tunities or resources. In effect, racial status is used under the ration-
ales as a proxy for victim status; membership in the racial group bene-
fited by a remedial preference establishes membership in a group of
"victims."
"Voluntary" Preferences
The Supreme Court has justified "voluntary" racial preferences
in employment under Title VII on the theory that, although the "letter"
of Title VII would prohibit them, its "spirit" does not.' More specifically,
such a preference furthers Title VII's general objective of increasing
minority employment and is therefore permissible if (1) it is a tempo-
rary measure designed to achieve rather than to permanently main-
tain racial balance, (2) it does not act as an absolute bar to non-minority
employment and (3) it does not require discharge of non-minorities."
There is, perhaps, an additional requirement. In the case in which
this scheme was announced, United Steelworkers v. Weber, the Supreme
Court emphasized that the racial preference there in issue was designed
to break down patterns of segregation generated by past discrimina-
tion on the part of trade unions. 8 It is possible to interpret that em-
phasis as requiring that an employer make "findings" of discrimination
and of the "present effects" of that discrminiation before adopting
a racial preference.
Two points should be noted about the Court's rationale in Weber.
First, the rationale again relies on the notion of remedy and that no-
tion is again the broad one employed in the other contexts summarized
here. A voluntary preference under Title VII need not remedy iden-
tified acts of discrimination and may benefit persons not shown to
have been the victims of identified acts of discrimination. Indeed, the
employer need not act to remedy the effects of its own conduct; it
may seek to remedy the discriminatory acts of third persons.
Second, it should be recognized that the meaning the Supreme
Court assigns to the term "voluntary" in this context is peculiar at
best. The primary motivation underlying a private employer's adop-
tion of a remedial racial preference is to avoid racial imbalance in
employee selection rates and in workforce representation rates. Such
26. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
27. Id. at 208-09.
28. Id. at 198 n.1.
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imbalances are often sufficient to make out a prima facie case of dis-
crimination under the disparate impact and disparate treatment
theories of discrimination. Preferences are therefore adopted to avoid
the threat of liability imposed, prima facie, for racial imbalance and
to avoid the litigation costs that would be incurred in attempting to
justify that imbalance.'
There may therefore be a greater congruity between the scope
of the substantive definition of prohibited discrimination and the scope
of the "voluntary" racial preference employed as a remedy for dis-
crimination than first appears. To the extent that the substantive defi-
nition can be characterized as functionally prohibiting race or gender
imbalances, a voluntary remedial preference designed to achieve pro-
portional allocation of opportunities and benefits rather tightly fits
the scope of the possible violation that motivates adoption of the pref-
erence.
Preferences Under Conciliation Agreements and Consent Decrees
The final context in which race and gender preferences appear
is in Title VII settlement or conciliation agreements and consent
decrees. This phenomenon is a natural outgrowth of the judicial prac-
tice of imposing preferences as remedies and of the employer incentive
structure generated by the threat of liability for race and gender im-
balances. That is, a preference found in a consent decree may be
justified both on the theory that it does no more than what a court
could have done had the case been fully litigated and on the theory
that it does no more than what the employer could have done "volun-
tarily" under Weber." Settlement agreements and consent decrees con-
taining race and gender preferences therefore confirm the interrelation-
ships between substantive theories of Title VII liability and preferential
remedies noted here in the other contexts in which preferences are
employed. Preferential remedies will be agreed upon in settlement
because settlement by definition occurs to avoid the costs of litigation
and because settlement is most likely to occur where the risk of court
imposed liability and court imposed remedies are perceived to be high.
Those risks in the Title VII context are that liability will be imposed
for race or gender imbalance and that preferences will be judicially
mandated.
29. See id. at 209-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 246 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing); Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 229-34 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Wisdom, J., dissenting).
30. See Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1581 (5th Cir. 1984)
(Widsom, J., dissenting); Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982),
rev'd sub nom., Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
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II. THE STOTTS DECISION
The Supreme Court's opinion in Stotts reflects fundamental and
unresolved tensions in the Court's understanding of prohibited dis-
crimination under Title VII and in the Court's understanding of the
relationship between Title VII's prohibitions and remedies invocable
to redress violations of those prohibitions. In Stotts, a governmental
employer had entered into a Title VII consent decree containing a
racial preference by which the employer was to "attempt to ensure"
that 50% of job vacancies and 20% of promotions would be given
to qualified black persons. 1 The objective of the preference was to
increase the proportion of black persons in the employer's workforce
approximately to the proportion of black persons in the labor force
in the county in which the employer was located. Subsequently, the
employer laid off employees pursuant to the "last hired, first fired"
rule of seniority provisions contained in an agreement between the
employer and the union representing the employer's employees.n As
black employees hired under the consent decree were junior in senior-
ity to white employees hired earlier, the layoff threatened the pro-
portional racial representation objectives of the consent decree.
31. Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2581 (1984).
32. Id. at 2581.82. The agreement between the city and union was unenforceable
under state law, but the majority opinion in Stotts treated its unenforceability as ir-
relevant because the city's unilateral adoption of the agreement placed the seniority
system in effect. Id. at 2585 n. 7. An implication of this treatment is that Section
703(h) preserves both collectively bargained and unilaterally adopted sepiority systems.
Had the agreement been enforceable, white employees injured by layoffs in
breach of the agreement may have had an action for backpay on the theory that the
city undertook inconsistent contractual obligations. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union
759, 461 U.S. 757 (1983). That potential basis for compensating non-minority employees
was, however, apparently viewed by the Supreme Court majority as irrelevant; the
city's rights and interests under the decree and under Title VII were the focus of
the Court's analysis.
The Court's focus is interesting in part because the Sixth Circuit had rejected
an attempt by non-minority employees to intervene on the theory that the proposed
intervenors sought to collaterally attack the consent decree. Stotts v. Memphis Fire
Dept.. 679 F.2d 541, 558-59 (5th Cir. 1982); Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d
579 (6th Cir. 1982). That conclusion would threaten the possibility of any challenge
to a court's post-decree interpretation or modification of a decree where a party (such
as the city in Stotts) declined to object. Cf. Grann v. City of Madison, 738 F.2d 786
(7th Cir. 1984) (state fair employment agency order may not be attacked under Title
VII by non-minorities). The difficulty with the Sixth Circuit's theory is that it treats
intervention at a time at which a court makes a disputed interpretation or modifica-
tion of a prior decree as a collateral attack. See Stotts v. Memphis Fire Department,
679 F.2d 579, 586 (6th Cir. 1982) (Martin, J., dissenting). Cf. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local
Union, 461 U.S. 757, 759 (1983) (employer liable for breach of collective bargaining
agreement where breach occurred in compliance with Title VII conciliation agreement).
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However, the decree did not specifically address layoffs or seniority
and did not award competitive seniority to the black employees hired
or promoted under it.'
The District Court in Stotts enjoined layoffs of black employees
and modified the consent decree to ensure that layoffs would not de-
crease the percentage of black employees employed prior to the
layoff.3 ' The modification resulted in the layoff of some white employ-
ees with greater seniority than some retained black employees.
The Court of Appeals affirmed on two theories. First, the modi-
fication merely enforced the original decree by requiring that the
employer comply with its obligation to increase the percentage of black
persons in its workforce.35 Second, the modification was permissible
even though it conflicted with the seniority provisions of the
employer's agreement with the union.' The modification was permissi-
ble because the consent decree was a "settlement," and parties to
litigation may by settlement agreement alter seniority systems.s7 Alter-
natively, the modification was permissible either because the consent
decree did no more than a court could have done in altering seniority
provisions as a remedy following a finding of discrimination,38 or
because the modification did no more than what the employer could
have done "voluntarily" under Weber.9
The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion that rejected each
of the Court of Appeals' theories. The Court first rejected the lower
court's construction of the original decree: as that decree did not
specifically address seniority or layoffs, the parties to the decree must
not have intended to override the provisions of an agreement with
a third party, the union, not a party to the decree. 0 The Court next
rejected the lower court's arguments that the seniority provisions of
the agreement between the city and the union could be overridden
by modifying the consent decree. The lower court's settlement theory
33. 104 S. Ct. at 2586.
34. Id. at 2582. The dissenting justices in Stotts contended that the lower court
merely issued a temporary injunction. Id. at 2600 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Both the
Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit treated the district court's action as, in effect,
a permanent modification. Id. at 2585 n.8; 679 F.2d at 551.
35. 679 F.2d at 557-58.
36. Id. at 564.
37. Id. at 564-66.
38. Id. at 566.
39. Id. at 566-67.
40. 104 S. Ct. at 2585-86.
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was rejected on the ground that the consent decree did not address
seniority: the modification did not enforce a settlement because there
was no settlement regarding the disputed issue of layoffs pursuant
to the seniority provisions of the agreement between the employer
and the union."' The lower court's theory that the modification did
no more than what a court could have done in remedying a violation
was rejected on the theory that a court may not modify a seniority
system to, in effect, grant extra seniority to black employees merely
because they were black; a finding that black persons were victims
of discrimination would be a prerequisite to such an award." Finally,
the lower court's theory that the modification did no more than the
employer could have done under Weber was rejected as irrelevant;
the employer did not in fact voluntarily adopt the modification.'"
Stotts is currently controversial because the Supreme Court's
argument that the modification exceeded the remedial powers of a court
under Title VII appears to threaten racial preferences as remedies for
discrimination established in litigation. That argument was grounded
on two propositions. First, Section 703(h) of Title VII, which immunizes
seniority systems from attack absent proof that they are created or
used to intentionally discriminate," precludes a remedy that would
modify such a system except where an identified actual victim of an
unlawful discriminatory practice is granted retroactive seniority as
compensation for harm directly caused by that practice." This propo-
sition is a partial rejection of the notion that Title VII remedies are
conceptually distinct from Title VII's definitions of prohibited conduct
41. Id. at 2487-88.
42. Id. at 2588-90.
43. Id. at 2590.
44. 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(h) (1982). See Pullman Standard v. Swint, 102 S. Ct.
1781 (1982); American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 102 S. Ct. 1534 (1982); Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Section 703(h) provides, in relevant part, that "it
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different stan-
dards or compensation, or different terms, conditions or privileges of employment pur-
suant to a bona fide seniority . . . system . . . provided that such differences are
not the result of an intention to discriminate. Title VII S 703(h), 42 U.S.C. S
2000e-2(h) (1982).
45. 104 S. Ct. at 2588:
Here, there was no finding that any of the blacks protected from layoff
had been a victim of discrimination and no award of competitive senior-
ity to any of them. Nor had the parties in formulating the consent decree
purported to identify any specific employee entitled to particular relief
other than those listed in the exhibits attached to the decree. It therefore
seems to us that in light of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977)
the Court of Appeals imposed on the parties as an adjunct of settlement
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and is therefore a direct threat to a primary justification in lower
court opinions for remedial preferences. Moreover, the proposition is
a direct threat to the notion that the scope of Title VII's remedies
need not fit the scope of formal definitions of substantive violations.
The Court's second proposition was that the policy underlying
Section 706(g) of Title VII' "is to provide make-whole relief only to
those who have been actual victims of illegal discrimination. . .. '"'
In support of this proposition the Court emphasized aspects of the
1964 legislative history in which Title VII's sponsors argued that the
statute did not grant courts authority to impose quotas or to grant
remedies to non-victims.48 The Court's second proposition and its argu-
ment in support of the proposition is a direct assault upon judicially
imposed racial preferences as remedies for Title VII violations.
The controversy surrounding Stotts emanates from uncertainty
regarding whether the Court meant what it said about the remedial
something that could not have been ordered had the case gone to trial
and the plaintiffs proved that a pattern or practice of discrimination
existed.
46. 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(g) (1982):
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or
is intentionally engaging in such unlawful employment practice charged
in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in
such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as
may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstate-
ment or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate .... No order of the court
shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member
of a union or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as
an employee, or the payment to him of any -back pay, if such individual
was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employ-
ment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other
than discrmination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
or in violation of S 2000e-3(a) of this title.
47. 104 S. Ct. at 2589.
48. Id. at 2588-89:
Our ruling in Teamsters that a court can award competitive seniority only
when the beneficiary of the award has actually been a victim of illegal
discrimination is consistent with the policy behind S 706(g) of Title VII,
which affects- the remedies available in Title VII litigation. That policy,
which is to provide make-whole relief only to those who have been actual
victims of illegal discrimination, was repeatedly expressed by the spon-
sors of the Act during the congressional debates.
See id. at 2590:
The Court of Appeals holding that the District Court's order was per-
missible as a valid Title VII remedial order ignores not only our ruling
in Teamsters but the policy behind S 706(g) as well. Accordingly, that
holding cannot serve as a basis for sustaining the District Court's order.
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authority of the courts. One basis for this uncertainty is that the Court
may be accused of issuing an advisory opinion regarding its interpre-
tations of Sections 703(h) and 706(g). Recall that the issue in Stotts
was whether the lower court's modification of a consent decree was
warranted. The issue was not whether a court may impose a racial
preference as a remedy after it finds a violation of Title VII. A sec-
ond basis for this uncertainty is that it is not clear whether the Court's
analysis regarding permissable remedies is confined to contexts in
which race .or gender preferences would conflict with seniority
systems. Although that analysis rested in part upon a characterization
of Section 706(g) remedial policy with broad implications, the analysis
emphasized Section 703(h)'s protection of seniority.
There nevertheless remain reasons to believe that the Court's
analysis in Stotts does mean that the Court is prepared to reject
preferences as available judicial remedies. In the first place, the asser-
tion that the Supreme Court issued an advisory opinion is questionable.
That assertion rests on the arguments that Title VII was irrelevant
to the issues in Stotts because those issues entailed only the interpre-
tation of the consent decree and that, if those issues are treated in-
stead as entailing a problem of judicial authority to modify a consent
decree, the proper reference for that determination is the decree,
rather than the statute."9
These arguments are unpersuasive. The Court of Appeals
grounded its decision in the alternative; rejection of the Court of Ap-
peals' construction of the decree did not obviate that court's conclusion
that the district court had inherent authority to modify the decree.
Nor is it true that the question of modification could be decided solely
by reference to the decree or to the law of modification. Although
the law of consent decrees is not distinguished by the clarity with
which it has addressed the question of the relationship between such
decrees and the statutes they are intended to enforce,' the Supreme
Court squarely held in Stotts that a modification inconsistent with Title
49. See, id. at 2594-95 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 2610 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
50. Compare System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1901) (rehed
upon by the majority in Stotts) with United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,
420 U.S. 223 (1975) (relied upon by the dissent in Stotts). It is interesting to note,
however, that Continental Baking itself recognized the "dual character" of consent
decrees, 420 U.S. at 236 n.10, and that Continental Baking entailed a problem of deter-
mining a remedy for conduct conceded to violate the consent decree there in issue.
The Court therefore distinguished cases in which the question was whether the con-
sent decree had been violated. Id. at 237. See United States v. Atlantic Refining Co.,
360 U.S. 19 (1959); Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353 (1952). The latter cases re-
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VII cannot be ordered-" That holding required a determination
whether the modification in fact ordered was inconsistent with Title
VII. It is possible to disagree with this holding, but disagreement is
not a reason for concluding that the Court issued an advisory opin-
ion. The Court would have issued an advisory opinion only if it had
concluded that the district court's modification was not to be measured
against the statute.
A second reason for questioning attempts at distinguishing Stotts
is that, while the Supreme Court's opinion may legitimately be char-
acterized as limited to the question of Section 703(h)'s effect on the
availability of preferential remedies, the fact remains that the opin-
quire reference to the consent decree rather than to underlying statutory purposes
because the consent decree, as a compromise, is likely to impose lesser obligations than
the statute it enforces. See, Continental Baking, 420 U.S. at 235-36.
Under the majority's characterization of the problem before the Court in Stotts,
the consent decree did not itself impose the obligations imposed by the lower courts
and the lower courts had sought to impose these obligations by reference to Title
VII. Although it is possible to claim that the Court could simply have rejected the
lower court's conclusions on the basis that they went beyond the decree, it is also
possible to characterize the lower courts' analyses as interpreting the decree at issue
in Stotts in light of Title VII. It may be that a consent decree is supposed to be inter-
preted from its "four corners", but, in fact, that is not a plausible understanding of
the act of interpretation; the four corners of the decree were written within a context-
most obviously within the context of the statute. On these premises, it was appropriate
to look to the statute as a guide to interpretation of the decree precisely because
parties to a settlement can be expected to impose lesser obligations by settlement
than could have been possible through litigation. The irony in the lower courts' analyses
is that those courts imposed, under the Supreme Court's conclusions, greater obliga-
tions by "settlement" than could have imposed through litigation.
51. 104 S. Ct. at 2587 n.9:
The dissent seems to suggest .... and Justice Stevens expressly states,
... that Title VII is irrelevant in determining whether the District Court
acted properly in modifying the consent decree. However, this was Title
VII litigation, and in affirming modifications of the decree, the Court of
Appeals relied extensively on what it considered to be its authority under
Title VII. That is the posture in which the case comes to us. Further-
more, the District Court's authority to impose a modification of a decree
is not wholly dependent on the decree. "[Tihe District Court's authority
to adopt a consent decree comes only from the statute which the decree
is intended to enforce," not from the parties' consent to the decree. Systems
Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651 (1961). In recognition of
this principle, this Court in Wright held that when a change in the law
brought the terms of a decree into conflict with the statute pursuant to
which the decree was entered, the decree should be modified over the
objections of one of the parties bound by the decree. By the same token,
and for the same reason, a district court cannot enter a disputed modifica-
tion of a consent decree in Title VII litigation if the resulting order is
inconsistent with that statute.
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ion addresses Section 706(g) at length and adopts a controversial defini-
tion of the scope of the remedial authority conferred by that Section.
It is possible to adopt a limited understanding of the holding in Stotts,
but Supreme Court holdings may be less important than is commonly
imagined. 2 What may matter instead is that the Court has signalled
its doubts about judicially imposed remedial preferences. That signal-
ling may not compel a rejection of such remedies, but neither can
the signal be ignored. The Court may in the future decide either to
reject or to affirm the remedial authority of the lower courts in this
context; the Supreme Court is not distinguished by the attention it
pays to the logic of its prior opinions." But the remedial issue, once
thought squarely foreclosed by the unanimous opinion of the Courts
of Appeals asserting authority to order preferences,' is clearly again
on the table.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF STOTTS
There is an ironic twist to the controversy regarding Stotts. The
controversy has for the most part ignored what should be the most
controversial of the implications of the Supreme Court's analysis. As
earlier noted, there is a fundamental linkage between race and gender
preference as remedies for discrimination and functional definitions
Thus, Title VII necessarily acted as a limit on the District Court's
authority to modify the decree over the objections of the City; the issue
cannot be resolved solely by reference to the terms of the decree and
notions of equity. Since ... Title VII precludes a district court from displac-
ing a non-minority employee with seniority under the contractually
established seniority system absent either a finding that the seniority
system was adopted with discriminatory intent or a determination that
such a remedy was necessary to make whole a proven victim of discrimina-
tion, the District Court was precluded from granting such relief over the
City's objection in this case.
It is possible to dispute my characterization of this excerpt as "holding." I
think it "holding" for purposes of the case; whether it is "holding" in the sense of
the doctrine of precedent is dependent upon one's view of the meaning of that doc-
trine. For example, compare E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949) pages
2-4 with pages 33 and 58-61. It should nevertheless be apparent that the very claim
that the Court issued an advisory opinion is unintelligable absent some concept of
holding and precedent, and quite probably a concept that accounts for the notion of
a "rule."
52. Cf. P. BoBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, 190-95 (1982) ("cueing function" of some
Supreme Court decisions in constitutional law).
53. See Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV.
1 (1980).
54. See Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2606 n. 10 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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of discrimination 5  Formal definitions of prohibited discrimination
employed by the courts under Title VII do not purport to ground
liability on race or gender imbalances. Indeed, formal definitions
eschew such a notion."6 Liability is formally imposed for intentional
discrimination or for the insufficiently justified use of race and gender
neutral criteria having a disparate impact on minorities or women;
imbalance is mere evidence. To the extent, however, that imbalance
is judicially viewed as extremely persuasive evidence, these formal
definitions have quite different functional implications. The point is
illustrated by the consent decree in Stotts and by the "voluntary" af-
firmative action plan in Weber: one may avoid the risk of liability im-
posed for reasons of the persuasive character of an imbalance by agree-
ing to correct that imbalance. What does the Court's analysis in Stotts
portend for these functional implications?
Perhaps nothing; the Court addressed a remedy issue, not a
liability issue. If, however, it is plausible that remedial preferences
are compatible with functional definitions of discrimination under Title
VII, a rejection of such preferences may well suggest movement away
from the functional implications of formal definitions and toward the
formal definitions themselves.
To put the matter more directly: if race and gender preferences
designed to correct workforce imbalances are not an appropriate
remedy for discrimination, then perhaps workforce imbalance is not
an appropriate functional definition of discrimination. Imbalance is an
appropriate functional definition if discrimination is understood as a
failure to achieve Title VII's ultimate objectives-full employment of
minorities and women. On that understanding, it is conceptually prop-
er to predicate liability, operationally, on employer failures to remedy
the "present effects of past discrimination." But if discrimination is
understood instead in terms of the conception invoked by the Court's
analysis in Stotts, as a discrete wrongful act having discrete remediable
consequences, liability imposed merely for the disparate effects of an
employer's race and gender neutral practices is a conceptual anomaly.
It is the anomalous character of such a basis for liability, given the
conception invoked by the Court's analysis in Stotts, that should con-
stitute the most controversial of the implications of the Court's opinion.
Perhaps this anomaly may be clarified by making it more con-
crete. The disparate impact theory of discrimination, under which race
55. See supra text following notes 17, 25, and 29.
56. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n. 10 (1977).
57. See generally Freeman, supra note 17.
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and gender neutral criteria may be challenged, can be viewed as serv-
ing one or more of three distinct functions.'
If the "business necessity" or "job relatedness" an employer must
establish to justify a challenged employment practice is measured
against a reasonableness criterion,59 the disparate impact theory may
be viewed as an approximation of a disparate treatment, or inten-
tional discrimination, theory. To the etent that an employment prac-
tice is not reasonably related to some legitimate business interest and
that the practice excludes from an employment opportunity a substan-
tial proportion of minorities or of women, it may be inferred that the
practice was adopted or maintained for an illicit reason, as a proxy
for race or gender. An argument justifying this conception of the
disparate impact theory is that the pretextual use of race and gender
neutral criteria is difficult to establish directly and that this difficulty
results in underenforcement of Title VII's prohibition of intentional
discrimination. On this view, the disparate impact model is employed
as an overinclusive means of precluding pretextual use of neutral
criteria or as a means of precluding the "functional equivalent" of
intentional discrimination-discrimination similar to but not synony-
mous with disparate treatment."
Given this conception of the disparate impact theory, a finding
of liability under the theory would warrant a compensatory remedy
for actual victims of the use of an invalidated employment practice.
As the theory's objective is to preclude employer action undertaken
by reference to the race or gender of individuals, individuals harmed
in fact by an employer's pretextual use of an employment practice
should be made whole.
58. See Cox, supra note 22, at 45-97.
59. See New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n. 31 (1978);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp.
1094 (D.S.C. 1977), affd, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978).
60. Compare Brest, supra note 16, at 35; Perry, The Disproportionate Impact
Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 540, 551-53 (1977) (explaining
disparate impact theory in terms of illicit motive theory) with Fiss, supra note 17,
at 301-02 (explaining disparate impact theory on a functional equivalence rationale).
Under Professor Fiss' explanation, a race and gender neutral employer rule generating
disparate race or gender results is the functional equivalent of disparate treatment
where (1) the disparity is such that the rule is more likely to exclude members of
a minority group than non-minorities, (2) those excluded by the rule have no control
over possession of the talent or quality measured by the rule, and (3) the rule is
unrelated to productivity. Id. To the extent that the last of these elements is measured
under a reasonableness standard-does the rule have a reasonable relationshp to
employee productivity-the functional equivalence rationale would appear to be a fairly
close approximation of a disparate treatment theory. See Comment, The Business Necessi-
ty Defense to Disparate-Impact Liability Under Title VII, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 911 (1979).
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To the extent, however, that the business necessity or job re-
latedness defense requires proof that a challenged practice is essen-
tial," or to the extent that the defense imposes substantial financial
costs of quasi-scientific validation of employment criteria," two alter-
native functions may be viewed as served by the disparate impact
theory. If this more stringent standard is applied to employment prac-
tices likely to give effect to identifiable instances of societal discrimi-
nation- discrimination in education affecting relative access to educa-
tional credentials is an example-then the theory functions as a means
of partially remedying that societal discrimination. On this premise,
a racial quota may be viewed as an appropriate remedy following a
finding of liability because it directly enforces an employer's functional
obligation, under this version of the impact theory, to absorb a por-
tion of the present costs of past societal discrimination. However, if
this version of impact theory is viewed merely as proscribing the use
of criteria which give effect to societal discrimination and not as
directly compensating the presumed victims of that discrimination,
a racial quota would not seem appropriate as a remedy. In that event,
mere elimination of criteria generating unlawful effects would be the
appropriate remedy, 3 at least unless an additional quota remedy is
viewed as a means of deterring use of such criteria.
61. See, e.g., Johnson v. Uncle Ben's Inc., 657 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1981); Parsons
v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
968 (1979). Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971). But see, e.g., Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 705 F.2d 1492
(9th Cir. 1983); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
62. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1607
(1984).
63. Cf. Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey Dept. of Civil Service, 667 F.2d
1074, 1080-84 (3d Cir. 1981) (applying Title VII charge filing limitations period to im-
pact claim). But cf. Guardians Ass'n of New York City v. Civil Service Comm'n., 633
F.2d 232, 249-51 (2d Cir. 1980) (employing continuing violation theory to avoid cutting
off an impact claim), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981). Identified persons actually af-
fected by such criteria might nevertheless be compensated. Franks v. Bowman Transpor-
tation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
It should be noted, however, that even this limited understanding of the objec-
tive underlying this version of impact theory may, as a practical matter, be compati-
ble with proportional hiring or promotion by reference to race or gender. See Connec-
ticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 463 (1982) (Powell, J. dissenting) (arguing that a legal stan-
dard requiring abrogation of race-neutral criteria compels adoption of quotas). Abrogation
of race and gender neutral criteria requires that an employer substitute other criteria-
often more subjective assessments. To the extent that representation rate disparities
generated by subjective assessments are judicially treated as strong evidence of in-
tentional discrimination, an employer is encouraged to adopt policies that will avoid
generating such evidence. See supra note 18. Moreover, to the extent that an employer's
defense to a disparate treatment claim founded upon representation rate disparities
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Alternatively, if the more stringent business necessity defense
is applicable to all employment practices, whether or not these prac-
tices give effect to identified instances of past discrimination, then
the disparate impact theory functions as a means of enforcing an equal
achievement objective: an employer's failure to proportionally allocate
employment opportunities among race and gender groups is function-
ally prohibited. Under this view, race and gender preferences are
clearly warranted, for they directly enforce a legal obligation of pro-
portional allocation. Indeed, the third version of the impact theory
may be viewed as indirect means of judicially imposing under Title
VII an affirmative action obligation, and both the EEOC" and some
lower federal court judges appear to have so viewed it. 5
On the assumption that these alternative understandings of the
disparate impact theory are for present purposes accepted, the im-
plication of the Supreme Court's opinion in Stotts becomes more
focused. Stotts may be viewed as a threat not merely to preferential
remedies, but perhaps to the second and certainly to the third of the
alternative versions of the disparate impact theory identified here.
If the Court is serious about the conception of permissible remedies
that its analysis invoked in Stotts, its opinion may confirm the tendency
in other of its more recent cases" to confine the scope and content
of Title VII's substantive definitions of prohibited discrimination.
is to establish that a race and gender neutral criterion, rather than race or gender,
"caused" the disparities, the employer's "defense" established a prima facie case of
disparate impact liability. See Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1265-73 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
The functional consequence of this "catch-22" may be that employers are required to
adopt proportional hiring and promotion policies even where the disparate impact theory
is viewed as authorizing merely an injunction against further use of a challenged neutral
criterion.
64. Compare 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1607 (1984) (employee selection guidelines) with 29
C.F.R. Pt. 1608 (1984) (affirmative action guidelines).
65. See Weber v. Kaiser Alum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 231-32 (5th Cir.
1977) (Wisdom, J. dissenting), rev'd sub. nom., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193 (1979). Cf. Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1581 (5th Cir. 1984)
(Wisdom, J. dissenting) (reasonableness of preferences in consent decree should be
measured in part by threat of litigation and liability if decree is not approved); Stotts
v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 541, 566 (6th Cir. 1982) (permissible remedies in a
consent decree are to be measured by permissible scope of remedies imposed by a
court under Title VII following findings of discrimination, rev'd sub. nom., Firefighters
Local 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984); Armstrong v. Board of School Directors,
616 F.2d 305, 312 (7th Cir. 1980) (same).
66. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (rejecting "bottom line
balance" as a defense to impact theory and therefore implicitly rejecting a group right
to equal achievement as an explanation of the impact theory); New York Transit Authori-
ty v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n. 31 (1979) (relaxing the business necessity defense).
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IV. THE POST-STOTTS VIABILITY OF
UNITED STEELWORKERS v. WEBER
A post-Stotts development should be of interest given this inter-
pretation of Stotts. There appears to be some disagreement among
the Third, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth circuits regarding the appropriate
interpretation of the Supreme Court's opinion in United Steelworkers
v. Weber O in the context of affirmative action plans voluntarily adopted
by governmental employers. That disagreement appears at least par-
tially influenced by judicial perceptions of the effect of the Supreme
Court's analysis in Stotts.
The controversy is perhaps best introduced by examining a re-
cent dissenting opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist and joined by
the Chief Justice and Justice White, from denial of a writ of certiorari
in Bushey v. New York State Civil Service Commission.-8 In that case,
the State of New York adopted an affirmative action plan under which
it adjusted civil service examinations scores of minority applicants
to ensure that the examination did not generate a disparate impact
on minorities. The Second Circuit, rely on Weber, held the plan lawful
under Title VII in part on the theory that the state merely attemp-
ted to comply with the disparate impact theory of unlawful discrimi-
nation.69 The Supreme Court denied certiorari, perhaps in part because
the parties attacking the state's plan had not pressed the constitutional
claim that interested Justice Rehnquist and the other dissenting
justices. 0
The claim that interested Justice Rehnquist, who dissented in
Weber, was that Weber is inapplicable where a government's "volun-
tary" affirmative action plan is attacked under the equal protection
clause. Justice Rehnquist's dissent strongly suggests that at least three
members of the Court would insist on "findings of discrimination" and
would insist that such findings cannot be predicated on a mere dispar-
ity in selection or representation rates.' Indeed, Justice Rehnquist
argued in the dissent that a government employer, to justify a race
or gender preference, must conclude that continued use of a criterion
generating disparate impact cannot arguably be justified. The Justice's
argument links the availability of Weber as a defense to disparate
67. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
68. 105 S. Ct. 803 (1985).
69. Bushey v. New York State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 733 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1984).
See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted,
53 U.S.L.W. 3727 (U.S. April 15, 1985).
70. See Bushey, 105 S. Ct. at 806 (dissenting opinion).
71. Id. at 805.
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treatment theory directly to the first version of disparate impact
theory postulated in this paper." Perhaps the dissenters would go
further, for Justice Rehnquist makes the blanket statement in his dis-
sent that "[sitates should not be allowed to practice racial discrimina-
tion anew under the guise of atoning for past discrimination or because
of the difficulties with mounting an otherwise legitimate defense to
a lawsuit." 3
The Seventh Circuit, in Janowiak v. City of South Bend,"' held
that a lower court had improperly granted summary judgment to the
defendant city in a suit challenging an affirmative action plan under
the equal protection clause and under Title VII. The circuit court's
opinion echoes a strong theme in Justice Rehnquist's Bushey dissent:
mere statistical disparities will not suffice to establish the "past
discrimination" necessary to justify a remedial preference under either
Title VII or the Constitution."
However, the Ninth Circuit, in Johnson v. Transportation Agency
Santa Clara County,"' appears to have concluded that statistical
disparities standing alone are sufficient to justify a government's adop-
tion of a voluntary plan. Moreover, the Third Circuit, in Kromnick
v. School District of Philadelphia," upheld, in the face of constitutional
and Title VII attacks, a teacher assignment policy, framed expressly
in terms of a racial quota, on the theories that the policy remedied
general racist attitudes in the community and furthered a congres-
sional policy of ensuring integration in school faculties. ' The Third
Circuit's opinion therefore goes further than the Ninth Circuit's
reliance on representation rate disparities as a justification for
preferences. That opinion also distinguishes Stotts on the theory that
Stotts is limited to instances of layoffs and judicially imposed over-
rides of seniority systems.79
72. Id. at 806. See supra text accompanying notes 58-64. The suggestion is
however inconsistent with the Court's conclusion, in Weber, that voluntary affirmative
action need not be predicated on an employer's conclusion that it has arguably violated
Title VII. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 n. 8 (1979).
73. Id.
74. 750 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1984).
75. Janouiak, 750 F.2d at 563, 564. But cf. Lehman v. Yellow Freight Systems,
Inc., 651 F.2d 520, 527 (7th Cir. 1981) ("some type of statistical disparity" necessary
to justify a preference).
76. 748 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1984). See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 746
F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3727 (U.S. April 15, 1985).
77. 739 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied 53 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Jan. 7, 1985).
78. Id. at 904-06.
79. Id. at 911.
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The Sixth Circuit, in Van Aken v. Young,"0 upheld a city's volun-
tary affirmative action plan in the face of constitutional and Title VII
attacks on the theory that the plan remedied "gross racial discrimina-
tion" on the part of the city, as established by representation rate
disparities. Stotts was distinguished in Van Aken on the ground that
it did not overrule Weber.1 Finally, the Sixth Circuit, in Vanguard
of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland,n distinguished Stotts and relied upon
Weber in approving a consent decree containing preferences designed
to increase the proportion of black and hispanic officers in a police
force. As the city agreed to the preference, and as Section 703(h)
merely permits rather than requires differentiations founded upon
seniority, Stotts is, according to the Sixth Circuit, inapplicable to a
voluntary assumption of affirmative action obligations in a consent
decree.
Van Aken and Vanguard of Cleveland raise rather directly the
tension between Weber and Stotts. In both Sixth Circuit cases, the
preferences at issue were challenged by non-minorities or by a union
affected under the preferences, rather than by parties to the prefer-
ences. To the extent that non-minorities and unions are treated as
lacking protectable interests under Sections 703(h) and 706(g),13 the
statutory provisions relied upon in Stotts, the Supreme Court's con-
clusion, in Weber, that an employer may voluntarily adopt a preference
80. Janowiak, 750 F.2d 43 (6th Cir. 1984).
81. Id. at 45.
It should be noted that the lower courts have not enforced even Weber's limited
requirements for voluntary affirmative action. They have not required that remedial
preferences he temporary measures designed to "attain" rather than to "maintain"
racial balance. See Kromnick v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 739 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1984);
Tangren v. Wackenhut Services, Inc., 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 916 (1982). They have not required that a preference remedy discrimination in
"traditionally segregated job categories." See Electrical Workers, I.B.E.W. Local 35
v. City of Hartford, 625 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). They
have not in at least some instances required that a preference be remedial. See Talbert
v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982).
But see Lehman v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 651 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1981).
82. 753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir. 1985).
83. See id. at 486: "In short, these sections provide a shield to an employer
in defending a Title VII action, not a sword to an employee claiming that certain con-
duct violates Title VII." Cf. Stotts v. Memphis Fire Department, 679 F.2d 579 (6th
Cir. 1982) (denying that non-minorities have a protectable interest entitling them to
challenge a consent decree modification); Grann v. City of Madison, 738 F.2d 786 (7th
Cir. 1984) (state fair employment agency order cannot be attacked by non-minorities).
But cf. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757 (1983) (employer liable for
breach of collective bargaining agreement required by compliance with Title VII con-
ciliation agreement); Stotts v. Memphis Fire Department, 679 F.2d 579, 586 (6th Cir.
1982) (Martin, J., dissenting) (intervention is not a collateral attack).
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would seem controlling both where the employer does so in a consent
decree and where the employer does so independently of the legal
process."
The difficulty with this logic, in the context at least of consent
decrees, is, however, that it permits an agreement in settlement of
Title VII litigation inconsistent with the Supreme Court's characteriza-
tion of Title VII policy in Stotts. The characterization may be cir-
cumvented on the obvious ground that the source of the characteriza-
tion, Section 706(g), applies only to an order of the court requiring
preferences,' but that circumvention ignores the rationale underly-
ing the characterization. According to the Supreme Court in Stotts,
Section 706(g)'s limitations on the remedial authority of the courts
reflect a congressional distaste for quotas." That distaste is arguably
a substantive policy' both inconsistent with preferences adopted under
a threat of litigation and a source of the legal protection for non-
minorities denied in Van Aken and Vanguard of Cleveland.8
Nevertheless, Stotts did not overrule Weber or the Court's distinc-
tion between required preferences and permitted preferences in that
case. It is possible, however, that the Court will modify or limit Weber.
There are four techniques available for confining the scope of the
Weber decision. The first is to conclude that a government lacks the
discretion of a private employer because the Constitution requires find-
ings of discrimination by a competent fact finder. On this theory, it
would be possible to require more by way of findings than a simple
reliance on statistical disparities and to require a legislative, or
perhaps congressional fact finder.'
A union's or employee's stake in a collective bargaining agreement's seniority
system would presumably be sufficient to invoke the protection of Section 703(h) where
a consent decree modified that system. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977). Cf. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union, 461 U.S. 757. 759 (1983). However, the
Sixth Circuit in Vanguard of Cleveland characterized the decree there in issue as not
affecting the applicable seniority system. 753 F.2d at 486. But see id. at 490 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). The argument supporting the proposition that non-minorities have no
protectable interests under Section 706(g) is that the provision merely limits judicial
authority; it confers no rights. This argument ignores a probable reason for Section
706(gYs limitations on judicial authority: protection of the interests of non-minorities.
See Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 782-91 (1976) (Powell,
J., dissenting).
84. But see Vanguard of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479, 493
(6th Cir. 1985) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); infra text accompanying notes 98-100.
85. Vanguard of Cleveland, 753 F.2d at 487.
86. 104 S. Ct. at 2588-89.
87. See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(j) (1982); United Steelworkers v. Weber. 443 U.S.
193. 245-46 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
88. See supra note 83.
89. Compare Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
19851
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The second available technique is to impose a similar fact find-
ing requirement under Title VII on both governmental and private
employers. Weber could be interpreted to require more direct proof
of past discrimination than statistical disparity"0 and to require that
an employer establish a significant risk of liability under the disparate
impact theory as a justification for adopting a preference. Such an
interpretation would constitute a partial adoption of the "arguable
violation" or unilateral settlement theory rejected in Weber,9 but the
interpretation could also be tied to a clarification of disparate impact
theory. Specifically, the first version of impact theory postulated here'
could be made the basis of a unilateral settlement rationale for affir-
mative action by requiring that an employer have no arguably rea-
sonable defense to threatened liability. Otherwise, an employer could
easily establish threatened liability as a justification for voluntary
preferences by simply citing the difficulty of proving business necessity
under strict versions of that defense.93
The third available technique is to treat the Weber affirmative
action exception to disparate treatment liability under Title VII as
an affirmative defense, thus shifting a burden of persuasion to the
party relying on Weber to justify a preference.9 The Ninth Circuit,
denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982) with Associated General Contractors of Cal. v. San Fran-
cisco Unified Sch. Dist., 616 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1061 (1980).
The Supreme Court may decide this issue next term. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed.,
746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3727 (U.S. April 15, 1985) (No.
84-1340).
: 90. At least one Circuit has, however, concluded that no finding of past dis-
crimination, or even of substantial disparity is required. See Electrical Workers, I.B.E.W.,
Local 35 v. City of Hartford, 625 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
91. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 n. 8 (1979). The
arguable violation theory was postulated by Judge Wisdom in a dissent from the Fifth
Circuit's opinion in Weber. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216,
230 (5th Cir. 1977). Under that theory, voluntary affirmative action is viewed express-
ly as an employer response to threatened impact theory liability. See United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 211 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
93. See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 230 (5th
Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979).
There is, however, an additional difficulty that would have to be faced if this
limitation were adopted. To the extent that an employer is subject to Executive Order
11246 as a federal contractor, affirmative action preferences are adopted pursuant to
that order and to Labor Department regulations implementing the order. See 41 C.F.R.
Pt. 60 (1984). It would therefore be necessary either to recognize compliance with these
regulations as a defense to a disparate treatment allegation or to invalidate the regula-
tions as inconsistent with Title VII.
94. Justification might be framed in terms of the *elements emphasized in
Weber, supra text accompanying notes 26-28, or might be made more difficult by re-
quiring substantial proof of past discrimination on the part of the party adopting a
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over a strong dissent," imposed the burden of persuasion on the plain-
tiff in Johnson," as did the Sixth Circuit in Van Aken." However,
Weber recognizes a justification for disparate treatment, and justifica-
tions for otherwise unlawful conduct are generally treated by the law
as affirmative defenses.
The final technique by which Weber may be limited is to con-
cluded that Stotts applies to consent decrees and that Weber applies
to voluntary preferences adopted outside the legal process." This
distinction would require an extension of Stotts. In Stotts, the Court
held that a modification judicially imposed over the objection of a party
to a consent decree must be measured against the relief obtainable
under Title VII; the Court did not directly address the question
whether a consent decree must itself be measured against that stan-
dard. However, Stotts would seem directly applicable to a consent
decree "voluntarily" entered into by parties to litigation where the
decree intrudes upon a seniority system in which intervening non-
preference. The later alternative would, as a practical matter, gut Weber, because it
is doubtful that employers would be interested in establishing a case against themselves
or in therefore subjecting themselves to backpay claims. It should be noted, however,
that employers who adopt affirmative action plans pursuant to the E.E.O.C.'s affir-
mative action guidelines. 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1608 (1984), may claim reliance on those guidelines
as an alternative defense, at least unless the guidelines are judicially invalidated or
are treated as not constituting a written interpretation of the E.E.O.C. See 42 U.S.C.
J 2000e-12(b)(1) (1982); 29 C.F.R. J 1608.2 (1984).
95. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 748 F.2d 1308,
1314-20 (9th Cir. 1984) (Wallace, J., concurring and dissenting).
96. 748 F.2d at 1310 n.2.
97. 750 F.2d at 44. See also Setser v. Novak Investment Co., 657 F.2d 962
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981); Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652
F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
These opinions impose a McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
scheme as a framework for analysis of affirmative action plans under Weber. A defendant
seeking to uphold its plan must therefore "articulate" a "legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason" for its plan. This is a rather obvious distortion of disparate treatment theory.
McDonnell-Dougals and its progeny establish a proof scheme for inferring intentional
discrimination from circumstantial evidence; a defendant's "articulation" of a legitimate
reason for its actions under that scheme is a means of denying that intentional discrim-
ination occurred. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
An affirmative action plan by definition distinguishes between persons by reference
to race or gender and therefore by definition intentionally discriminates. McDonnell-
Douglas is not even remotely relevant to the question of justification of intentional
discrimination. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 53 U.S.L.W. 4024 (1985).
The analysis of the circuit courts is a transparent attempt to ease the burden of justifica-
tion imposed on defendants in this context by taking advantage of the Supreme Court's
holding, in Burdine, that an employer has merely a burden of production of evidence
where it denies that it has intentionally discriminated.
98. Vanguard of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479, 493 (6th Cir.
1985) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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minorities have enforceable interests and where those non-minorities
challenge the decree. Moreover, Stotts could be extended to consent
decrees in contexts in which Section 703(h) is not a factor by con-
cluding that judicial action approving a proposed consent decree is
an "order of the court" within the meaning of Section 706(g) and of
the Supreme Court's interpretation of that Section's limitations on
judicial remedial authority.9 Stotts might also be extended by con-
cluding that intervening non-minorities have protectable interests con-
ferred by those limitations.'
This leaves the question whether the Supreme Court will con-
fine Weber. Predicting the Court's behavior is, of course, a hazardous
undertaking. However, there is a reason to believe that the Court
may confine Weber. That reason is Stotts. As argued here earlier,
remedial race and gender preferences are compatible with some under-
standings of functional definitions of unlawful employment discrimi-
nation and largely incompatible with formal definitions of unlawful
employment discrimination. The Court's analysis in Stotts clearly em-
phasizes formal definitions and clearly rejects the implications of func-
tional definitions in the remedial context. That rejection has substan-
tive implications, as illustrated here earlier with respect to disparate
impact theory.' An additional substantive implication is, however,
that Weber is conceptually inconsistent with the Court's view of judicial
remedial authority in Stotts. It is conceptually inconsistent because
Weber authorized voluntarily adopted remedial preferences to correct
past societal discrimination; Stotts may be read as rejecting judicially
imposed remedial preferences to correct even a defendant's own acts
of discrimination.
Now it is obvious that the cases are distinguishable. Weber en-
tailed a private decision judicially characterized as voluntary; Stotts
contemplated judicially ordered preferences. But the motivation for
the privately adopted preference in Weber was the perceived structure
and implications of the law;02 Stotts threatens the accuracy of that
perception and therefore diminishes the likelihood of private adoption.
99. Id. at 492.
100. But see supra note 83. It should be noted that these theories would re-
quire a partial rejection of the notion that a consent decree is to be treated as a
contract apart from the statute it enforces. See supra note 50.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 58-66.
102. However, in the context of governmental employers, it is possible that
preferences are adopted less for reasons of threatened liability than for reasons of
the political power of groups advocating such preferences. If this is an accurate specula-
tion, removing the incentive structure underlying private adoption would not eliminate
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Moreover, the decision in Weber was grounded upon a
characterization of the policy of Title VII at least partially denied in
Stotts. According to the Court in Weber, a privately adopted remedial
preference complies with Title VII's policy of increasing minority
employment-a form of compliance implicitly compelled by versions
of disparate impact theory which impose stringent justification require-
ments on employers. According to the Court in Stotts, a judicially im-
posed racial preference is inconsistent with Title VII's policy of provid-
ing make whole relief only to actual victims of unlawful discrimination
-a policy conceptually incompatible with a functional definition of
discrimination that treats as unlawful an employer's failure to allocate
employment opportunities proportionally among race and gender
groups.
Perhaps this conceptual incompatibility is best illustrated by
focusing upon an argument often employed in justifying both volun-
tary preferences under Weber and preferences adopted in settlement
agreements and consent decrees. That argument is that there is a
strong policy favoring "voluntary compliance" with Title VII. °3 The
difficulty with this argument is that it often ignores the question of
the content of the legal mandate with which voluntary compliance
is to be encouraged. Race and gender preferences clearly constitute
compliance if that mandate is proportional allocation of opportunities
among race and gender groups, but the Supreme Court's conception
of that mandate in Stotts is not compatible with proportional alloca-
tion. The Supreme Court's conception is instead that particular in-
dividuals are to be compensated for particular harm flowing from par-
ticular incidents of wrongful conduct. Neither voluntary preferences
nor perferences adopted in settlement constitute compliance with this
conception; they constitute compliance with a quite different understan-
ding of Title VII.
It may be the case that voluntarily adopted preferences are
distinct from judicially imposed preferences because voluntary pref-
erences are not "required", but it is also the case that preferences
the phenomenon. In that event, a policy of eliminating preferences would require in-
voking the Constitution to trump the political process or would require a formal over-
ruling of Weber. Perhaps Justice Rehnquist's invocation of the Constitution to distinguish
Weber in his Bushey dissent may be explained on this basis.
103. See, e.g., Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1581-82 (5th Cir.
1984) (Wisdom, J., dissenting): Stotts v. Memphis Fire Department, 679 F.2d 541, 566
(6th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub. nom. Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984);
Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 230 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom,
J., dissenting), rev'd sub. nom. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
1985]
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are less likely to be adopted where they cannot be judicially compelled.
They are even less likely to be adopted if Stotts foreshadows an ef-
fort to confine the disparate impact theory. In short, the Court need
not directly overrule Weber to functionally overrule Weber. A func-
tional overruling can occur by incrementally limiting Weber's scope
and by reducing the litigation incentives which motivate adoption of
"voluntary" race and gender preferences.
CONCLUSION
We are repeatedly reminded that the life of the law has not been
logic; nor, perhaps, has the life of the law been conceptual symmetry.
Certainly the law of Title VII is persuasive evidence for both prop-
ositions.' It is nevertheless possible that the Supreme Court may
move in the direction of symmetry by modifying its interpretations
of Title VII's substantive prohibitions to render them more compati-
ble with its interpretation, in Stotts, of Title VII's remedial policy.
Such a movement would be bad news for advocates of "affirmative
action," understood as preferential treatment of minorities and
women."
05
Ironically, a direct attack merely upon the legitimacy of race and
gender preferences would be bad news for employers and other poten-
tial defendants if it is not followed or preceded by an effort to limit
the functional implications of substantive theories of unlawful discrimi-
nation. Although there has been substantial resistance to affirmative
action, many employers may have embraced the concept as a relatively
direct and certain means of complying with the functional implica-
tions of the disparate impact theory.' ° To the extent that Stotts casts
doubt on Weber, and to the extent that the Supreme Court fails to
resolve the tensions in its precedents in this area, employers are again
faced with uncertainty about the mandates of antidiscrmination law.
104. See generally Cox, supra note 22.
105. See Employee Rel. Wkly (B.N.A.), Oct. 15, 1984, at 1262 (distinguishing
"affirmative action" as "quotas" and "affirmative action" as outreach and recruitment
efforts).
Although section 706(g), 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(g) (1982), authorizes "affirmative ac-
tion", it is not clear that the phrase was viewed as including preferences when enacted.
Cf. Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2590 n. 15 (1984) (arguing that
1972 amendments to Section 706(g) did not authorize preferences). But cf id. at 2609-10
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that 1972 amendments did authorize preferences).
It should be noted that there are other terms in Section 706(g) that have been given
peculiar meanings by judicial interpretation. Although Section 706(g) authorizes remedies
only for "intentional" discrimination, that phrase has been viewed as meaning that
the intentional use of a race and gender neutral criterion is a remediable act. By con-
trast, the notion of intentional discrimination when used to described the disparate
treatment theory of discrimination refers to illicit motive. See Cox, supra note 22.
106. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 456-64 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 4 [1985], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss4/1
